



# ICBSS Black Sea Monitor

Issue No. 9, November 2008

ISSN 1791-664X

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## Making Sense of the EU Approach towards its Eastern Neighbourhood

Much discussion is underway these days regarding the best way the European Union can approach its eastern neighbours. (continued on page 2)

## THE BLACK SEA MONITOR

The ICBSS has identified the need for a special circular on developments in and around the Black Sea region that goes beyond the mere news brief format. Therefore, the Centre has set up an electronic review focused particularly on the Black Sea region, aiming to provide stakeholders and other interested parties around the globe with an exclusive information service. The Monitor offers brief commentaries and refers key documents, publications and events of interest that impact on the wider Black Sea region.

As a result, and probably to be expected, much confusion abounds as EU member states are divided on how best to address the region.

Undoubtedly, Russia in its dual capacity as one of the Union's most important partners and new neighbour is at the core of the debate given the on-off nature of EU-Russia talks on a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement which has taken a turn for the worse after the Georgian-Russian conflict of August. Do the EU and Russia share the same objectives in managing their common neighbourhood or does the prospect of EU membership, however distant if at all possible it might be at this time, for some of the common neighbours put the two sides on a collision course? Perceptions are important here – the inability of some EU member states to overcome their genuine fears of Russia and therefore insist on EU and NATO membership for those outside hoping to get in coupled with Moscow's propensity to have its say exclusively along its western periphery suggest that both sides consider the other as 'revisionist' and prone to a zero-sum game type of relationship.

Unfortunately, it looks like these perceptions are going to be with us for some time to come, albeit there is some hope that they be somewhat mitigated if good sense prevails. A first step would be to reduce the NATO rhetoric and refocus on a "More EU – Less NATO aspirations" approach. This in effect seems for the time being to be the trend especially since the Alliance's Bucharest Summit last April, the August war in Georgia and the election of Barack Obama to the White House.

Step Two would necessitate the EU to find a balance between Russia's projected force and the other countries' willingness to cooperate further with the EU. The EU should acknowledge the European identity of the states of the region, and keep open the prospect of membership in the long term. This entails the formulation of an ENP+ that neither closes the door nor does it open it further to those countries that aspire to join the EU but allows for a further upgrade of their relations

with the Union. Such a 'European promise' would help to reinforce the reform process in all the countries of the region including conceivably the unrecognised territories.

Which policy then is the best for the Union and its neighbours? The divisions among member states have led to policy confusion. As a result in response to its Eastern Neighbourhood, the EU has already launched a Black Sea Synergy Policy within the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP); it is considering an 'Eastern Partnership' policy while it is also trying to define the context or place for the Turkish proposal for a "Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform" while simultaneously attempting to upgrade its relationship, both working and contractual, with regional organisations such as the BSEC. All these initiatives which are usually led by a country or a group of countries could conceivably create new problems as they seem to be redundant, uncoordinated and lack coherence.

The current debate in Brussels about the adoption of an Eastern Partnership that focuses on deepening bilateral cooperation by offering more profound integration with the EU to the ENP East partners including Belarus seems to complicate somehow the formulation of a coherent policy as it contains many of the priorities of the Black Sea Synergy. If it is conceived as a parallel track to the Black Sea Synergy process, it should be explicitly made clear as should the interaction/complementarity between the two policies. When drafting a European policy for the Black Sea region, it is important to avoid any possible overlapping between these two policy proposals/documents that might create confusion and thus weaken the credibility and the efficiency of the EU itself.

One suggestion that this author is making would be to rename the Black Sea Synergy policy and call it *Enhanced Black Sea Synergy* whereby regional cooperation between all regional states (including Russia) and the EU coupled by deeper integration with the EU by the ENP East partners go hand in hand.

Overall, there should be a formulation for a new EU regional policy on the Black Sea. In this context, an Eastern Partnership with clear objectives, Europeanising features, strong instruments and promising ‘carrots’ along with an enhanced, project-oriented Black Sea Synergy, is a good start. This could at least help avoid the confusion regarding policy proliferation, replication and incoherence. It should be noted, that the Black Sea Synergy should not be underestimated as it managed to raise from the very beginning the political identity of the region and thus paved the way for a more coherent EU approach towards the region as a whole. Sidelining or eventually burying it in favour of, undoubtedly, an ‘in your face’ policy would not help improve the state of EU-Russian relations and, by extension, regional security and stability anytime soon.

**DIMITRIOS TRIANTAPHYLLOU**

**EU External Relations Council  
Conclusions on the European Security and  
Defence Policy  
(Brussels, 10-11 November 2008)**

[...]

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

I. ESDP operations and missions

[...]

**South Caucasus**

**EUMM Georgia**

The Council welcomed the rapid and effective deployment, on 1 October, of the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia). It emphasised the quality of the work done to date and the need to maintain the same level of engagement over the coming months, and reaffirmed its determination that the mission would continue fully to implement its mandate in Georgia.

[...]

**The Priorities of the Armenian  
Chairmanship of the Organization of the  
Black Sea Economic Cooperation  
1 November 2008 –30 April 2009  
(Istanbul, 5 November 2008)**

The Republic of Armenia is for the second time during its membership in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization assuming the Chairmanship of the respectful forum. This is a solemn duty to take the helm and steer the Organization which over the years has become a full-fledged entity setting the trend not only throughout the region but also far beyond it.

In the meantime, the Republic of Armenia, as Chairman-in-Office, is fully conscious of its high responsibility since the BSEC Organization, which has stood the long-period test of time, is now obliged to withstand the new inner as well as global challenges of the contemporary world.

In this respect, Armenia feels impelled to exert its efforts for further consolidation of

the BSEC stand in and outside the region in mostly complicated world developments of global significance.

The Armenian Chairmanship-in-Office will keep following the strict adherence to the Charter of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization and other statutory documents of BSEC with the view of all-round enhancement of multilateral socio-economic cooperation through the Organization's innovative project-oriented agenda. Proceeding along this way a close cooperation with the previous and future Chairmanships-in-Office, the BSEC Permanent International Secretariat, Member States and related bodies, observers and sectoral dialogue partners are of the highest importance.

The global and regional economic developments as well as the actual dynamic processes in social and international life are being thoroughly analyzed and elaborated within the scope of BSEC, which is reflected on the Organization's agenda. The Republic of Armenia takes its constructive part in these processes firmly believing that the entire agenda is as of the high priority. Proceeding from the realities and perspectives of the social and economic developments of the contemporary world as well as the development tendencies within BSEC, the Armenian Chairmanship finds it essential to focus among the other priority areas on the following:

**Enhancement of cooperation in energy sector**

Given the strategic significance of the BSEC region, the Armenian Chairmanship-in-Office will undertake initial steps in the process of formulating an integrated BSEC regional energy strategy based on the provisions of the relevant BSEC declarations, as well as the strategy of enhanced cooperation with the EU energy related structures in the light of the 2008 Kyiv Declaration. Which means:

- Elaboration of a Draft BSEC-EU Joint Policy Action in Energy and proposals for the European Commission to support BSEC in

promoting cooperation in energy throughout the region.

- Deliberations on the BSEC Regional Study on Energy at the up-coming meetings of the Working Group.
- Initiating and leading the process of developing multilateral legal instruments that would facilitate purpose-oriented activities in energy sector within the framework of BSEC.
- Promotion of active interaction with international organizations, in particular, with the EC, and with other major players in the field of energy in the region.
- Elaboration of the 2008-2010 Action Plan of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on Electrical Networks interconnection.

#### **Development of the transport cooperation in the Region**

- The Armenian Chairmanship-in-Office will take steps towards the implementation of the provisions of the 2008 Odessa Joint Declaration on Cooperation in the Sphere of Transport in the BSEC Region. In order to promote reliable, efficient, environmentally sound, safe, secure, sustainable transport systems and policies in the BSEC member States, they among the other priority tasks should intensify joint efforts for making the process of integration of their legislations more effective and flexible.
- The Armenian Chairmanship-in-Office acknowledges the recent developments within the framework of implementation of one of the major Memoranda of Understanding signed by the Member States on Coordinated Development of the Black Sea Ring Highway, and calls for accelerating internal procedures to make come into force of another one - Development of the Motorways of the Sea at the BSEC Region. The issue of proper realization of the mentioned projects is on the priority agenda of the Chairmanship.
- The accomplishment of the MOU on Facilitation of Road Transport of Goods in the BSEC Region remains priority item on the Organization's transport cooperation. The Armenian Chairmanship attaches

importance to joining of all Member States to the Agreements on Simplification of Visa Procedures for Professional Lorry Drivers and for the Businesspeople Nationals of the BSEC Member States.


- The constructive dialogue and interaction between BSEC and the European Commission and international organizations and programs, such as UN ECE, UN ESCAP, IRF, IRU, TRACECA, EurAsEC, on the development of the Euro-Asian transport corridors passing through the BSEC region, are of high importance of the Chairmanship.

#### **Cooperation on environmental issues**

- Since the environmental issues do not recognize political borders due to their international nature there is an urgent necessity for integrating the national strategies and put the issues of water and air pollution, generation of waste, climate change, deforestation and degradation of biodiversity on the priority agenda of the BSEC Member States. The Armenian Chairmanship-in-Office will further encourage the PDF projects to be put into action in this field.
- To tackle with these global environmental issues the Member States should be guided by the basic documents adopted at the different level including the 2006 Bucharest Joint Declaration and the following decisions. Establishment and development of the BSEC Information Exchange Mechanism for the Environmental Protection could serve the best way to facilitate solving the issues.
- The Armenian Chairmanship-in-Office will continue considering the proposals and project ideas for regional cooperation on environmental problems between BSEC and the European Union.

#### **Joint efforts in enhancing cooperation in other priority areas**

- The Armenian Chairmanship-in-Office will attach importance to and strongly encourage the implementation of joint projects in the fields of information technologies, small and medium entrepreneurship, institutional renewal, agro-industry, science and social life.



• The particular importance will be gained in all-round cooperation in emergency assistance and in combating organized crime. The Armenian Chairmanship will contribute effectively to the implementation of the joint programs in these areas of cooperation on the basis of the BSEC legal instruments and would highly appreciate support and courage of the Member States.

#### **Improvement of the efficiency and credibility of BSEC**

• As any mechanism working intently, BSEC also needs the recurrent necessity of improving its operational and structural efficiency, reinforcing its visibility and cohesion.

As early as 2006, in Bucharest, the process of reforms in BSEC was envisaged. It was taken up by further initiatives having been eventually resulted in the across-the-board paper of “Guidelines on Improvement of the BSEC Efficiency” adopted in Tirana, in 2008.

• The Armenian Chairmanship-in-Office will further urge forward the implementation of the practical measures on the way of improving the efficiency, effectiveness and visibility of BSEC within the operational framework of the Guidelines.

• BSEC should improve its decision-making mechanisms at the level of the Working Groups and the Committee of Senior Officials so that the decisions taken by the Foreign Ministers Council be ensured more effective and realized more rapid.

• The Working Groups should interact closely with the Country Coordinators and the Permanent International Secretariat under the supervision of the Sectoral Ministerial meetings in order to coordinate smoothly deliberations and decision taking processes to ensure effective implementation of the Action Plans.

• As Chairman-in-Office, the Republic of Armenia will exert efforts to raise the role of the BSEC Member States by strengthening communication among them and enhancing interaction between the BSEC Permanent Representatives and PERMIS, supporting informal meetings at different levels and

organizing coordinating meetings of the Chairmanship-in-Office, the Related Bodies and PERMIS to contribute effectively to the improvement of efficiency and credibility of BSEC on the basis of improved legal documents.

• During the Chairmanship, every effort will be made to finalize the financial regulations and procedures of BSEC as well as the regulations for the staff of PERMIS. Higher efficiency of the project-oriented cooperation between the Member States and the Project Development Fund will be maintained. Active involvement of the Hellenic Development Fund in the BSEC agenda will be encouraged. Mutually beneficial cooperation with the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank as well as other international financial institutions will be further developed.

#### **Enhancement of the mutually advantageous cooperation between BSEC and the international actors**

• BSEC will further develop interaction with regional economic organizations and initiatives in different areas of cooperation strictly avoiding duplications and overlapping of functions.

• The Republic of Armenia is among the other BSEC Member States co-sponsoring the special resolution on cooperation between the United Nations and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation. The BSEC-UN relations will be mainly accentuated at the solving of social, economic and humanitarian issues to contribute to the project-resulted approaches with the support of international financial institutions. The BSEC Organization intends to have enhanced cooperation with the UN Economic Commission for Europe, the UN Development Program, the UN Industrial Development Organization, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and other organizations such as the World Health Organization, the UN Children’s Fund, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Organization of Economic Cooperation Development, World Bank etc.

• The BSEC-EU interaction will be further intensified to reach all-round cooperation on the principle of mutually advantageous partnership between the two entities. This partnership should be realized as it is provided for in the basic documents on enhanced relationship adopted in February 2008 in Kyiv. It is essential to note that the strategy papers and initiatives having been intensively introduced since 2002 should be put into action through the elaboration of appropriate mechanisms in the shape of concrete result-oriented projects for the benefit of both organizations.

Armenia is looking forward to intensifying partnership cooperation between BSEC and EU and other related European institutions through the new initiatives aimed at facilitating the deliberations of the BSEC-EU experts in a practical and result-oriented manner.

#### **Calendar of Events**

The Calendar of Events provides for around 60 events over the period of the Armenian Chairmanship-in-Office and includes a regular meeting of the BSEC Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, sectoral ministerial meetings, meetings of the Committee of Senior Officials and Working Groups meetings, international conferences, workshops, trainings, exhibitions etc.

The events are intended to have the BSEC multilateral economic and social cooperation agenda put into success for the sake of the Member States, the nations of the region and over the world.

In order to achieve these goals the Armenian Chairmanship-in-Office counts on active support and close cooperation of all Member States, related bodies, BSEC PERMIS, observer states and sectoral dialogue partners.

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**Speech by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, at the Annual Conference of the Institute for Security Studies of the European Union (Paris, 30 October 2008)**

Dear friends,


Let me start our "tour d'horizon" with the financial crisis. It has been the emblematic event of 2008, putting all else into the background. It is worth analysing, especially for its consequences for foreign policy. Allow me to make some observations:

First, the diagnosis. This crisis has confirmed that globalisation remains the dominant force shaping our world. This really is a global crisis. It has spread at incredible speed. Functionally, from sub-prime mortgages to credit markets to the real economy. And geographically from the US to Europe to emerging markets. Not everyone is affected equally; but no one is immune.

In its wake, the balance between markets, states and individuals will have to be adjusted. But globalisation itself - that is the global spread of goods, people, ideas and technology - will not stop. The crisis has highlighted globalisation's central dilemma. Today's big problems are global in nature. But the main resources and legitimacy are located at the national level. In a way, European integration is an attempt to resolve this core dilemma.

Regarding, the policy response, the crisis has demonstrated - once more - the need for stronger global institutions. With goodwill and creativity a lot can and has been achieved. Through ad-hoc crisis management among political leaders, central bankers and others. But if we are honest we must admit that the existing architecture is not up to the task - neither in Europe, nor globally.

I have been convinced, for some time, and I have underlined that in different fora, that the current international system is inadequate. Now the case for deep reform has become overwhelming. This must start with the international financial institutions. But we need to go further.



From the UN and the G8 to the regimes and institutions dealing with the big issues of our time: non-proliferation, energy and climate change, migration. Hopefully, the obvious need to deepen co-operation in the area of finance will act as a catalyst for these necessary wider reforms.

In any case, this effort cannot be handed by the US plus Europe alone. Even the talk of us "leading" is misleading. Apart from changing formats, the mindset needs changing too. We better not see this as the Western powers inviting the others for coffee after our discussions. We need all relevant players "present at the creation" of the new system, to use Acheson's famous phrase. And we need to be ready to engage them seriously. What about the consequences? The core answer is that the crisis is accelerating the power shift from the West to the East. This is true both in terms of material resources and ideological "pull". The bad debts are in the West, the surpluses in the East - even if the pain is everywhere. It is striking that a number of capital injections into our troubled banks are coming from Asia and the Gulf. The rise of key countries in Asia or Latin America used to be a subject for brainstormings and mid-term planning. This crisis has reduced the lead-time. The West needs the rising powers - and hence to get used to sharing power with them. There is more. Too often we discuss these issues in terms of integrating the new powers into the global system we devised. But we better prepare for the new powers having their own ideas on how the system must be run and reformed.

Let me also say briefly what the crisis does not mean:

It does not mean that the "old" agenda has gone away.

Take climate change. It remains the biggest global challenge we face. But rather than seeing this as a potential victim of the crisis, I prefer to underline the upside. Investing in green technologies, becoming a leader on carbon capture makes sense. In terms of climate change, energy policy, anti-poverty, inflation - but also our foreign policy. We need to change our mental map. And


consider this more as an opportunity to put our economies on a low carbon footing and less as unfair costs. Other mega-issues which have not gone away and which demand creative and determined efforts are non-proliferation and international terrorism. Moreover, enduring poverty remains an affront to our shared humanity. Let us not forget that 3 billion people, half the world's population, live on less than €2 per day. That means waking up every day and not knowing whether you will have enough food to feed your family. Roughly the same number of people lack access to clean water and basic sanitation.

As ever, the most vulnerable will be hit hardest by both climate change and the fallout of the financial crisis. It would therefore be wrong to delay or reduce our efforts to combat poverty just because the financial crisis has erupted. The other part of the "old agenda", the regional crises, is also still there. The Middle East, Iran, the Balkans and Georgia: all remain urgent.

At another level, not all the consequences of the crisis are bad. For example, oil is down from \$ 145 to below \$ 70. This is good because it helps curb inflation. But it also underlines that a strategy of using oil as a weapon has a fragile foundation. More generally, the crisis may promote more discipline and responsibility for individuals, companies and countries, forcing them to live within their means. Let me break down this macro picture into more detailed snapshots:

Concerning the United States, we are on the eve of crucial elections. Europeans and Americans alike, seem keen to begin a new chapter I have been and remain a firm believer in the power of the US and Europe to act as a force for good around the world.

What we need to do now is formulate an agenda for action. Of course the financial crisis means there are important constraints on any new administration. Managing expectations will be key. But the imperative for tackling urgent challenges is clear. Beginning with Israel-Palestine. The parameters of an agreement are clear - and have been for some time. It is urgent to,



finally, bring this conflict to an end, through persistent engagement.

Then there is Afghanistan, with elections looming and big dilemmas facing us on the effectiveness of our efforts and how we can maintain public support.

Together with the US, we need to work out what our strategy is. How can we best support the two governments, in Afghanistan and Pakistan, achieve the levels of effectiveness, legitimacy and cross-border co-operation they need? As a second step we should work out as Europeans what additional resources we might be able to provide.

Iran is not far behind, where the case for a determined and more creative effort, building on the two-track approach, is compelling.

A new push on non-proliferation and disarmament is also needed, with the NPT review conference coming up in 2010. I very much welcome the new thinking that has emerged in the US on these issues.

In all of this, the US and Europe need to pull in the same direction. At the same time we must realise that doing so is no longer enough.

From Sudan to Lebanon, from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe and beyond: we have long agreed with the US what must happen. What we have learned is that we need to bring other players, with their own positions, with us and define solutions together. From China to Russia, from the African Union to Arab League, from the UN to the OSCE. Still, politically, these elections present a unique opportunity to re-launch the Transatlantic relationship. Europeans tend to discuss this in terms of what we would like to see changed. That is understandable. But we must be willing to match "demands" with "supplies".

Thus, the emphasis should be on how Europe can help achieve common objectives. That we are ready to assume greater responsibilities. That we bring assets to the table. If Europe wants to be heard, it has to offer more than just advice.

Let me now turn to Russia. It is clear we have had a difficult summer. The conflict in Georgia brought us images of violence, destruction and refugees we hoped we would no longer witness in Europe. I believe we can say with a straight face that the EU rose to the occasion. In particular I want to recall the work done by the French Presidency, specially President Sarkozy.


From the negotiations on a ceasefire, to the agreement on troop withdrawals, to the deployment of our monitoring mission in record time and the co-hosting of the Geneva talks. We have acted in unity, with determination and we have achieved clear results.

Of course, many things remain to be done. Of course, the wider regional implications still need to be addressed. But I am pleased with the leadership that the European Union has shown, on the diplomatic front and with people on the ground.

Concerning Russia itself, I don't want to offer a Grand Theory. My job today is to deal with the diplomacy of a complicated world. What I have learned is that being aware of context and history is useful.

We think, for good reasons, that the liberation and integration of Central and Eastern Europe was exactly that. Liberation and integration. These are the basis for a stable Europe. The Russian memories of that period are different. They feel we took advantage of their weakness in the 1990s. They now talk of re-asserting themselves; of the need of the world to show respect. Trying to understand the mindset is not the same as agreeing with it.

Russia has changed. But so has the world around it. As I said before, globalisation will remain dominant trend, throwing up multiple new problems. You all know the list. We will solve these problems better if Russia is inside the system and feels committed to it. There are few international problems that can be solved without Russia; and almost nothing against Russia. At the same time, Russia needs the rest of the world to modernise its economy. That is President Medvedev's agenda.



This need for international cooperation gives us an opening. In today's world where so much rests on trust and reputations, it is not a good sign if you have bad relations with many of your neighbours.

I believe our policy on Russia should be both principled and rational. Principled means we expect international agreements to be honoured. We count on Russia to uphold international standards and the commitments it has made voluntarily, also inside. Rational means we should control our rhetoric - also when they don't. We should bear in mind that indignation is not a policy. Negotiating with Russia is not always easy. But experience demonstrates that hard-headed engagement delivers results. And getting results in turn helps maintaining unity.

With Russia we also share a continent. That is why we have no interest in a Russia which feels insecure. In Western Europe we learned, the hard way, that security is best based on trust rather than power. Trust is built up over time.

Of course, the Georgia conflict is a big set back. It has strengthened the fears of Russia's neighbours. But at some point we have to start again. One obvious place to re-start would be the arms control and disarmament agenda. I regret it has been neglected. In Europe we want to see the CFE Treaty functioning properly. There is also a real need to step up joint work on securing nuclear materials. Another possibility, perhaps for a later stage, is Medvedev's plan for a European Security Treaty. The fact that this is still vague is an advantage: it means that there is something to shape. A last word on energy. The central notion here is interdependence. Yes the European Union imports 42 percent of its gas from Russia, but all the infrastructure runs West. The concern is not that Russia will cut supplies. That would cut their revenues and destroy their reputation. It is rather that they are investing heavily in gaining leverage including downstream and not enough in future production. Gazprom production fell this year for the first time. As everyone knows, there is a lot we can do on energy savings,

connecting our grids and pooling our efforts when we negotiate with suppliers. This does require more discipline on our side. And Yes, diversification of supply and transit routes also makes sense. This is not easy but it is about time we got serious. To this end, we need to step up our engagement with Azerbaijan and Central Asia, underlining that what Europe has to offer is broader and deeper than just energy.

Let me turn to China. No matter how often it is repeated these days, China's transformation is historic. It will truly change our world. And it is all the more impressive as it's only 30 years since the end of the Cultural Revolution. Our mental map still has China as a developing and mainly rural economy. But today China has as many workers in the industrial sector as the entire OECD world put together.

China's export performance is legendary - and increasingly competitive in high-tech markets. It is attracting record investments but also investing abroad itself, moving up the value chain. It is true that China is better at assembling than innovating. But according to a recent study, it is fast approaching the US and Europe in terms of scientific publications in nano-technologies.

And we all know that China has reserves of more than \$1.8 trillion - not insignificant if others are mired in deficits and debts. Clearly, China's transformation is far from complete. Around 500 million farmers still work on tiny plots in deep poverty. The economy needs to grow by more than 8% to avoid a rise in unemployment which could threaten social stability.

Nor is its transformation without its problems. Think of the environmental damage, the costs of social exclusion and the absence of political freedoms. It is difficult to have a first rate economy based on a weak system of the rule of law. But what China has achieved is extraordinary: 400 million people lifted out of poverty in just one decade. From my side, two things are important. First, that we approach China not only, or even mainly, as an economic issue. We should use a wider prism and engage China in a strategic manner. Progress on all the big issues of our

time requires constructive Chinese engagement, also in the field of human rights.

Second, it is wise to remember that how countries behave when they are on top depends on the manner in which they have been approached on the way there. Let me touch briefly on India. In terms of foreign policy, India is the biggest "swing" state in the system. It is phasing out its G77 mindset but has not yet replaced this with a clear alternative. It is a very robust democracy which we should engage. But questions remain over its stance on climate change. More than China, it seems content to describe this essentially as a problem created by others. Hence, it is perhaps too cautious about the notion of common but differentiated responsibility which other developing countries support.

Dear friends,

Let me turn to the state of Europe.

First, let us count our blessings. Without the euro, the financial crisis would have created chaos on currency markets. Second, let us be clear: Europe has responded well to both the financial crisis and the political crisis of Georgia. We can draw inspiration from these achievements. But clearly, there is a lot more to do.

I like to end with some thoughts on how we should play our cards in a more complex and less "Western" world:

If this world is moving to a system of continents, the answer from Europe should be obvious. We need a greater sense of urgency and realise that a credible European Union foreign policy is not an optional extra. I know very well the difficulties this entails. But if we continue pretty much as we are, what world will be living in? There is a risk that this will be a world shaped by and for others.

One area where Europe can and must take more initiatives is in developing new rules and institutions for a more complex and unstable world. If we don't stand up for multilateralism, who will? For us, multilateralism is "less than a religion" but

more than "just a method". If so, then it's up to Europe to be creative in terms of ideas and generous in terms of making space at the reformed institutions we need.

If this is a world of turbulence and opposites then we need more targeted, bespoke solutions, not "off the shelf" strategies. In some respects, Europe's niche and added value is the very fact that it has a feel for complexity. One of the things that Europe can do is get beyond totalising theories like the war on terror and get into the differences between China and Russia, between Hamas and Hezbollah, between Iran and Syria.

Above all, we should try harder to shape the agenda, not only react. It is true that almost no international issue or problem is discussed these days without the EU present. But being present is not the same as shaping the agenda. We still spend too much time on who in Europe will say something instead of what we will do. Process is not the same as progress.

We need to think more in terms of where we want to be in 6 or 12 months time; what levers we have and what price are we prepared to pay. To achieve this kind of step-change in our foreign policy, it is obvious that we need the Lisbon Treaty. We need it for the greater coherence and leadership it will provide. There is simply no way around it.

**United Nations General Assembly  
Cooperation between the United Nations  
and the Black Sea  
Economic Cooperation Organization  
Draft Resolution A/63/L.9  
(New York, 28 October 2008)**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolution 54/5 of 8 October 1999, by which it granted observer status to the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, as well as its resolutions 55/211 of 20 December 2000, 57/34 of 21 November 2002, 59/259 of 23 December 2004 and 61/4 of 20 October 2006 on cooperation between the United Nations and

the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization,

*Recalling also* that one of the purposes of the United Nations is to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social or humanitarian nature,

*Recalling further* the Articles of the Charter of the United Nations that encourage activities through regional cooperation for the promotion of the purposes and principles of the United Nations,

*Recalling* its Declaration on the Enhancement of Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Arrangements or Agencies in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security of 9 December 1994,<sup>1</sup>

*Recognizing* that any dispute or conflict in the region impedes cooperation, and stressing the need to solve such a dispute or conflict on the basis of the norms and principles of international law,

*Convinced* that the strengthening of cooperation between the United Nations and other organizations contributes to the promotion of the purposes and principles of the United Nations,

*Recalling* the report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to resolution 61/4,<sup>2</sup>

1. *Takes note* of the Declaration adopted by the Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization on the occasion of the Fifteenth Anniversary Summit of the

Organization, held in Istanbul on 25 June 2007;

2. *Reiterates the conviction* that multilateral economic cooperation contributes to enhancing peace, stability and security to the benefit of the Black Sea region;

3. *Welcomes* the efforts towards the completion of the process of reforms in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, envisaged in the Bucharest

statement of 26 April 2006, issued by the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, thus contributing to the enhancement of the efficiency and effectiveness of the Organization, as well as its role in the economic and social development of its member States;

4. *Takes note* of the resolve of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization to foster a pragmatic and project- and results-oriented approach in the spheres of common interest for its member States, where improved regional cooperation could create synergies and increase the efficiency of resources used;

5. *Welcomes* the activities of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization aimed at strengthening regional cooperation in fields such as energy, transport, institutional reform and good governance, trade and economic development, banking and finance, communications, agriculture and agro-industry, health care and pharmaceuticals, environmental protection, tourism, science and technology, exchange of statistical data and economic information, collaboration among customs services, and combating organized crime and illicit trafficking in drugs, weapons and radioactive material, acts of terrorism and illegal migration, and in other related areas;

6. *Also welcomes* the efforts of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization to elaborate and realize concrete joint regional projects, particularly in the fields of energy and transport, which will contribute to the development of the Euro-Asian transport links;

7. *Takes note*, within this framework, of the signing in Belgrade on 17 April 2007 of the Memorandum of Understanding for the Coordinated Development of the Black Sea Ring Highway and the Memorandum of Understanding on the Development of the Motorways of the Sea at the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization region;

8. *Welcomes* the financing of projects by the Project Development Fund of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization to the

<sup>1</sup> Resolution 49/57, annex.

<sup>2</sup> A/63/228-S/2008/531, sect. II.D.

benefit of the sustainable development of the Black Sea region;

9. *Appeals* for greater cooperation between the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization and international financial institutions in co-financing feasibility and pre-feasibility studies of the projects in the wider Black Sea area;

10. *Takes note* of the positive contributions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, the Business Council, the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank and the International Centre for Black Sea Studies to the strengthening of multifaceted regional cooperation in the wider Black Sea area;

11. *Also takes note* of the enhanced cooperation between the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization and the Economic Commission for Europe, the United Nations Development Programme and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization and the working contacts of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization with the World Bank, the United Nations Children's Fund and the World Health Organization, aimed at promoting the sustainable development of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization region;

12. *Welcomes* the multifaceted and fruitful cooperation between the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization and the Economic Commission for Europe, especially in the area of transport, within the framework of the Cooperation Agreement signed between the two organizations on 2 July 2001;

13. *Also welcomes* the launching of the Black Sea Trade and Investment Promotion Programme, the first partnership project between the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization and the United Nations Development Programme, on 1 December 2006 and the signing of the Cooperation Agreement between the two organizations in Istanbul on 28 June 2007;

14. *Takes note* of the establishment of cooperation between the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization and the United Nations Industrial Development

Organization International Centre for Hydrogen Energy Technologies, with emphasis placed on energy and environment;

15. *Also takes note* of the increased cooperation between the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and, within this framework, welcomes the launching on 1 September 2007 of the joint Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization-United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime project on strengthening the criminal justice response to trafficking in persons in the Black Sea region;

16. *Acknowledges* the commitment of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization to contributing to the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals at national, regional and global levels;

17. *Takes note* of the intensified cooperation between the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization and the European Union and supports the efforts of the Organization to take concrete steps to advance this cooperation in line with the provisions of the Declaration of 14 February 2008 of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization on a Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization-European Union Enhanced Relationship, issued by the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization;

18. *Also takes note* of the cooperation established between the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization and other regional organizations and initiatives;

19. *Invites* the Secretary-General to strengthen dialogue with the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization with a view to promoting cooperation and coordination between the two secretariats;

20. *Invites* the specialized agencies and other organizations and programmes of the United Nations system to cooperate with the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization in order to continue programmes with the Organization and its associated institutions for the achievement of their objectives;

21. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixty-fifth session a report on the implementation of the present resolution;

22. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-fifth session the sub-item entitled "Cooperation between the United Nations and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization".

**Conclusions of the Albanian Chairmanship  
at the 19<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the Council of the  
Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the BSEC  
Member States  
(Tirana, 23 October 2008)**

The Albanian Chairmanship-in-Office of the BSEC Organization,

*Reasserting* its commitment to and trust in BSEC as an actor for promoting peace, stability and prosperity in the wider Black Sea area.

*Taking guidance from* the Declarations adopted by Heads of State or Government of the BSEC Member States;

*Capitalizing* on the political assessments and executive dispositions of the Declarations adopted on the occasion of the past Meetings of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the BSEC Member States;

*Being aware* of the rising importance of the wider Black Sea area in world affairs, entailing responsibility of the Organization of BSEC in this respect;

*Stressing* that the effective regional cooperation through BSEC structures and mechanisms promotes economic and social development to the benefit of the countries and peoples of the wider Black Sea area, thus contributing to the building of confidence in the region;

*Acknowledging* that BSEC needs to be proactive in addressing the challenges of the evolving international environment;

*Recognizing* that further constructive steps are needed in order to enhance the decision-making mechanism and the effective implementation of the decisions adopted in

the BSEC framework, as well as to increase the BSEC effectiveness and visibility;

*Highlighting* the significant juncture at which are the relations of BSEC with the European Union,

1. *Welcomes* the adoption of the Decision by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the BSEC Member States of the *Guidelines on Improvement of the BSEC Efficiency*, as a step in the process of reforms of the BSEC.


2. *Declares* that the reform of BSEC is an open-ended process taking into account the new elements that emerge in the regional and international environment of the wider Black Sea area.

3. *Welcomes* the progress in the restructuring of the budgetary structure of the BSEC, allowing the Organization to better and more transparently benefit from funding opportunities.

4. *Emphasizes* the importance of reinforcing the project-oriented approach of BSEC. In this respect, the timely and effective implementation of the two major projects in the field of transport, namely the Development of the Motorways of the Sea at the BSEC Region and the Coordinated Development of the Black Sea Ring Highway, is encouraged and the expansion of the actors involved is recommended.

5. *Expresses* its satisfaction with the ratification by eight States Signatories of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the Coordinated Development of the Black Sea Ring Highway, with which the aforementioned document will be effective from 1 November 2008 and *calls on* the States Parties to take appropriate measures necessary for its effective implementation. The other States Signatories are called on to speed up their internal procedures for the ratification of this MoU.

6. *Highlights* the importance of developing stronger maritime transport links among the ports of the BSEC Region, with a view to contributing to the development of transport infrastructure and to creating favourable conditions for business cooperation. In this regard, it *calls on* the States Signatories of the



MoU on the Development of the Motorways of the Sea at the BSEC Region to speed up the relevant internal procedures necessary for its entering into force and implementation.

7. *Acclaims* the completion of the review of the BSEC Project Development Fund (PDF) and the approval of the revised Manual of Operations of the Fund and expresses its confidence that the new statutory framework will give fresh impetus to the functioning of PDF, ensuring its sustainability, visibility and contribution to the realization of projects with high regional development impact.

8. *Welcomes* the willingness of Romania to transfer an additional contribution to PDF as ODA fund, following the OECD eligibility of BSEC, and encourage other potential ODA donors to also contribute in order to strengthen PDF.

9. *Welcomes* the adoption of the Terms of Reference and Guidelines of the BSEC Hellenic Development Fund (BSEC/HDF) and *supports* the efforts towards the early launch of its operations.

10. *Expresses* its concern on the consequences of the international financial crisis and *highlights* the importance of taking all necessary measures to ensure the sustainable economic development of the BSEC Member States.

11. *Stresses* the importance of further enhancing regional cooperation in the field of protection and rehabilitation of the Black Sea marine environment and *reiterates* the call upon the Committee of Senior Officials to discuss and consider the preparation of a paper on the possible means of strengthening cooperation with relevant international organizations to cope with the challenge of pollution generated from the rivers and the hydrographical basins of the rivers flowing into the sea and other sources of pollution.

12. *Takes note* in a positive way that cooperation of the BSEC with the EU continues in an intensified way. Also *takes note* of the willingness to further promote the BSEC-EU interaction and the implementation of projects and programmes

of mutual interest, including Black Sea Sectoral Partnerships. The concerted actions of the States which are both BSEC and EU members, to facilitate, within the EU, the implementation of the Black Sea Synergy with BSEC as its main partner through concrete projects and other activities, are appreciated. In this context, the continued efforts of the negotiating country and other BSEC Member States are also highly appreciated.

13. *Recognizes* the commitment and contributions of the BSEC Related Bodies in the BSEC cooperation process in their respective fields of competence.

14. *Praises* the initiatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of BSEC (PABSEC) in enhancing its relations with the European Parliament and *encourages* PABSEC to step up its efforts in this direction.

15. *Welcomes* the recent two-fold increase of the BSTDB subscribed capital and *reiterates* its support to the Bank, in its efforts to become an eligible institution for the implementation of the EU's Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF), supporting at the same time its close contacts with other International Financial Institutions in this regard. The eligibility of the BSTDB to the NIF could allow the financing and promotion of major projects which will benefit the region.

16. *Welcomes* the continuation of the cooperation with regional organizations and initiatives, within the framework of Regional Coordination Meetings, with the aim of coordinating their calendars of events and avoiding duplication in their work and *encourages* the BSEC PERMIS and the BSEC Related Bodies to share their experiences in cooperation with these organizations and initiatives.

17. *Expresses* its satisfaction with the progress achieved in the implementation of the joint BSEC-UNDP project "Black Sea Trade and Investment Project".

18. *Expresses* its satisfaction with the activities and intensified cooperation in the fields of culture and tourism in promoting

the cultural identity of and the tourism opportunities in the region.

19. *Welcomes* the launching of the “Black Sea and Central Asian Economic Outlook Report” by the OECD Development Center in Bucharest (23 June 2008). The Member States are invited to examine the Report with the view of furthering economic development in the region.

20. *Appreciates* the completion of two important BSEC projects in the field of combating crime, jointly implemented with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The BSEC Member States are invited to further implement the Regional Action Plan for Strengthening the Criminal Justice Response to Trafficking in Persons and the Migration Policy Recommendations in the Black Sea Region.

The Albanian Chairmanship-In-Office takes this opportunity to express its gratitude to the Governments and Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the BSEC Member States, as well as to the representatives of BSEC Related Bodies, BSEC Observers and Sectoral Dialogue Partners for their support and contribution in making its Chairmanship to the BSEC organization a successful one.

Relying on the principles enshrined in the BSEC Charter, we express our confidence that our common achievements would be furthered on during the Armenian Chairmanship-in-Office.

**Speech by Benita Ferrero-Waldner,  
European Commissioner for External  
Relations and European Neighbourhood  
Policy, on “EU/Russia: A Challenging  
Partnership but One of the Most  
Important of our Times”  
(Strasbourg, 21 October 2008)**

Honourable Members of the European Parliament

Dear Friends

The European Union’s relationship with Russia is one of the most challenging of our


times. On the one hand we see a complex web of joint activities, and interwoven interests. On the other we see the backdrop of events in Georgia.

The European Council has asked for a review of EU/Russia relations, and this reflection takes place in the context of events which have cast a serious shadow over the EU Russia relationship: the violation of Georgia's territorial integrity with the use of force, and Russia's unilateral recognition of Abkhazia and south Ossetia. These remain unacceptable, and we cannot share the principles of foreign policy recently articulated in Moscow, including the resurgence of spheres of influence.

So, the ongoing review has to make a rather sober assessment of the EU's own self-interest in this relationship.

Yet at the same time, economic and trade relations between the EU and Russia are strong and getting stronger. Russia is already our third most important trading partner and we see growth rates of up to 20% a year. Energy is a major factor, but there is impressive growth in services too. With its recent high growth rates and emerging middle class, Russia is an important emerging market right on our doorstep that offers opportunities for EU businesses, notwithstanding the effects of the present financial crisis. The EU is a major investor in Russia, accounting for 80% of cumulative foreign investment. A significant share of Russian foreign reserves are in euro, making Russia one of the largest holders of euro-denominated assets in the world. For all these reasons, we have a stake in the continuing growth of the Russian economy. And in supporting Russia’s quest for modernization, including the development of a truly independent judiciary, able to enforce contracts. This is in line with the emphasis which President Medvedev has placed on the importance of the rule of law in Russia.

The security of energy supply and demand is a key component of our relationship. EU Member States are major buyers of Russian energy products and this is unlikely to change in the short to medium term. But the relationship is one of interdependence, not



dependence. Exports to the EU have made an important contribution to the impressive growth rates Russia has seen over the past 5-6 years. Nevertheless, a great deal of work has yet to be done to build up a genuine energy partnership based on the principles enshrined in the Energy Charter Treaty, namely transparency, reciprocity and non-discrimination.

Even more importantly, Russia is a key geopolitical actor, whose constructive involvement in international affairs is a necessary precondition for an effective international community. We therefore engage on Iran, the Middle East, Afghanistan, the Balkans and elsewhere, as well as in multilateral fora. We also have a common interest in pursuing the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In all these areas cooperation is not always easy, but we need to continue.

Greater cooperation in the area of Freedom, Security and Justice is helping to tackle threats posed by challenges such as terrorism and organized crime.

It is through dialogue that we have built up that we are able to discuss areas like Human Rights. Consultations are taking place, indeed, in Paris today. We will once again remind Russia of its commitments as a member of the Council of Europe and the OSCE, particularly regarding freedom of the press, and the events unfolding in Ingushetia as well as other human rights issues.

For us it is clear: Europe upholds values and established norms of international conduct and we stand by these in all circumstances. These include respect of territorial integrity and the peaceful resolution of disputes.

The European Council has noted with satisfaction that Russian troops have withdrawn from the zones adjacent to South Ossetia and Abkhazia as an essential step to implementing the 6 point plan.

Talks in Geneva were launched last week, and this was another important step forward. There is, of course, a great deal more to do.

Tomorrow I will host the Donors' Conference for Georgia to mobilize funding

for the reconstruction of damaged infrastructure, reintegration of internally displaced people and to accelerate Georgia's economic recovery from the conflict. In cooperation with the Parliament I intend to devote up to €500 million for this purpose and I should like to express my thanks to the Chairs of the Budget and Foreign Affairs Committees who have written to me expressing their support for this.

The review of EU/Russia relations which the European Council has requested will present a comprehensive overview of the many strands of the relationship – from our efforts to support Russia's accession to the WTO to visa facilitation, customs co-operation, educational exchanges and co-operation in scientific research. This review should guide us in approaching all our current activities with Russia, and those which are currently on hold. It should be discussed at the next GAERC on 10 November at which I hope we will be able to find the right understanding on pursuing negotiations for the New EU/Russia Agreement.

I say this because I know of no better way to pursue our own interests, and make our concerns listened to.

On the other hand, we must not behave as though nothing has happened. In all that we must ensure that we make a very clear-eyed assessment of our goals, and ensure that the EU stands behind these goals as a united force.

It is perhaps fitting that we hold this debate today, on the eve of tomorrow's international donors' conference that I will preside over with the World Bank and the French and Czech current and future presidencies.

The EU will continue to play its role, as we have done throughout this crisis, as a constructive, reliable partner, guided by its values and making a decisive contribution to stability, and to peace.

I thank you for your attention

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[...]

### **Energy Security**

17. Security of energy supply is a priority for the European Union. It involves the responsibility and solidarity of all the Member States. To this end, taking account of the report submitted by the Presidency<sup>1</sup>, the European Council has decided to step up the work in progress, by adopting the following guidelines and requesting the Commission to submit relevant proposals or initiatives, where necessary, to:

(a) finalise the legislative package on the internal market in electricity and gas before the end of the legislative period;

(b) expedite the implementation of the European Energy Efficiency Action Plan and the Strategic Energy Technology Plan;

(c) pursue with determination the diversification of energy sources, to which the measures in the energy/climate package contribute directly;

(d) promote improvement in the working of the market, in particular through greater transparency on flows and stockpiles and through sharing information on long-term requirements and resources;

(e) develop crisis mechanisms to deal with temporary disruptions to supplies;

(f) strengthen and add to critical infrastructure, particularly trans-European energy transport networks and liquefied natural gas terminals. Particular attention will be paid to interconnections and to the connection of the most isolated European countries, to the interface of European networks with supply infrastructure and to the need to diversify both sources and routes. The European Council supports the Commission initiative of establishing a plan of action to speed up interconnections in the Baltic region. A schedule of work will be drawn up for this purpose before the end of the year;

(g) develop the Union's energy relations with producer and transit countries with a view to securing stability of supply and diversifying its energy sources and supply routes. In this connection, the European Council welcomes the energy security initiatives taken by several Member States and, in particular, the meeting with the Caspian Sea countries and transit countries which will be organised by the Czech Presidency in the spring of 2009.

18. The European Council will return to this issue at its meeting in March 2009 to take stock of progress, in the light, also, of the Commission's forthcoming strategic energy review, and to adopt the necessary decisions.

[...]

### **Follow-up to the European Council of 1 September 2008**

21. The European Council notes with satisfaction that Russian troops have withdrawn from the zones adjacent to South Ossetia and Abkhazia as an essential additional step in the implementation of the agreements of 12 August and 8 September, as well as the launching in Geneva of the international discussions provided for by those agreements. The European Council is asking the Commission and the Council to continue a full in-depth evaluation of EU-Russia relations with a view to the forthcoming summit, scheduled to take place in Nice on 14 November. It will be taken into account in the further negotiations for a new Partnership Agreement with Russia.

22. The European Union is resolved, in particular through its neighbourhood policy, to continue supporting its eastern neighbours in their efforts to achieve economic modernisation and democratisation. The European Council stresses in this respect the importance of the outcome of the EU-Ukraine Summit in Paris and calls for relations between the Union and the Republic of Moldova and Georgia to be strengthened in accordance with the Council conclusions of 13 October. It is instructing the Council to conduct an initial examination of the proposals for a future "Eastern Partnership" of the European Union

which the Commission intends to submit in November.

[...]

**EU External Relations Council  
Conclusions on Georgia/Russia  
(Brussels, 13 October 2008)**

[...]

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

"1. The Council notes with satisfaction that, following the deployment by the European Union, under the Security and Defence Policy, of an independent civilian observer mission in Georgia, comprising more than 200 observers, Russian troops have withdrawn from the zones adjacent to South Ossetia and Abkhazia as an essential additional step in the implementation of the agreements of 12 August and 8 September, which were concluded with the mediation of the European Union. With reference to the conclusions of the European Council of 1 September and its own conclusions of 15 September, the Council calls on the parties to continue to implement their commitments, including with regard to the role of UNOMIG and OSCE observers. It notes with satisfaction UN Security Council Resolution 1839, which has extended the UNOMIG mandate by four months.

2. The Council reaffirms the willingness of the European Union to take an active part, in particular through its Special Representative for the crisis in Georgia, in the international discussions provided for in the agreements of 12 August and 8 September, which are set to commence on 15 October under the auspices of the EU, the UN and the OSCE. These discussions must focus on all the remaining problems, in particular that concerning arrangements for stability and security in the region and the urgent question of displaced persons, including the question of the upper Kodori valley and the Akhgori region. In this context, the Council reiterates its support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia..

3. The Council thanks the Commission for convening the high-level conference of donors in Brussels on 22 October, with the aim, in particular, of assisting displaced persons and restarting the Georgian economy. The European Union will contribute substantially via the contributions of the Community and those of the Member States, based on an overall needs assessment carried out by the World Bank in cooperation with the European Commission and other institutions. To strengthen relations between the European Union and Georgia, the Council is preparing to begin negotiations with Georgia in the near future on visa facilitation and readmission, and invites the Commission to continue preparatory work on the possible establishment of a deep and comprehensive free trade area, as soon as conditions permit."

[...]

**EU General Affairs Council  
Conclusions on Relations with the  
Republic of Moldova  
(Brussels, 13 October 2008)**

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

"1. The EU welcomes the recent increase in the pace of its relations with the Republic of Moldova. It is ready to have a deeper relationship in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy and to negotiate a new and ambitious agreement with Moldova soon. This agreement will go beyond the current Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and will include the aim of a comprehensive and deep free-trade area, to be put in place when the Republic of Moldova is ready to sustain the effects of full liberalisation of its trade with the EU. The aim of the agreement will be gradually to bring the Republic of Moldova and the EU closer together. The Council recalls in this connection, the facilitation agreement on visas which lays down the introduction of a visa-free travel regime for the citizens of the Republic of Moldova as a long-term perspective.



2. The Council would recall that the pace and quality of reforms in the Republic of Moldova will affect the nature of its relations with the EU. In this context, it would encourage the Moldovan authorities to make the necessary efforts to strengthen the rule of law and to implement their commitments on human rights and fundamental freedoms. The EU attaches particular importance to the parliamentary elections in the spring of 2009 being conducted in a democratic manner.

The EU will increase its engagement in efforts to resolve the conflict in Transnistria and reaffirms its attachment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova. The Council would recall that the "5 + 2" negotiating format is the only guarantee of the transparency and legitimacy needed to find a lasting solution. It calls on all the parties concerned to resume negotiations in the "5 + 2" format. It encourages the parties to the conflict to work together on confidence-building measures and stresses the contribution made by

assistance from the Community and the Member States in supporting and facilitating this process."

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## Recent Publications by the ICBSS



John Roberts. *Η ενεργειακή συνεργασία μεταξύ των κρατών μελών του Οργανισμού Οικονομικής Συνεργασίας Ευξείνου Πόντου (Energy Cooperation among the BSEC Member States)*. Κείμενα Πολιτικής Ξενοφών (Keimena Politikis Xenophon). Athens: Papazisis Publishers and ICBSS, November 2008.


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Dimitrios Triantaphyllou and Yannis Tsantoulis. "Looking beyond the Georgian Crisis: The EU in Search of an Enhanced Role in the Black Sea Region." *ICBSS Policy Brief*, no. 8. Athens: ICBSS, October 2008.

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## NEWS and EVENTS

### THIRD ICBSS ANNUAL LECTURE



The Third ICBSS Annual Lecture on "The Black Sea and the Georgian Crisis" was given by H.E. Yasar Yakis, Chairman of the European Union Harmonization Commission of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and Former Minister for Foreign Affairs. The event was held in Athens (NJV Athens Plaza Hotel, Syntagma Sq.) on 13 November 2008, at 13:00h, and was transmitted through a *live webcast* on our site. For more information click [here](#).

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### CALL FOR COMMENTARIES

The ICBSS welcomes scholarly contributions for the upcoming *ICBSS Commentaries* on the topic "Can Regional Cooperation Work as a Conflict Prevention Tool in the Wider Black Sea Area?" ICBSS Commentaries are expert opinions on topics of contemporary importance or on a current event of relevance to the wider Black Sea area. The deadline for submission is Monday, 8 December 2008. For more information click [here](#).

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### "WIDER BLACK SEA REGION: LOOKING FOR THE 21ST CENTURY'S STRATEGIC SOLUTIONS"

An international conference on "Wider Black Sea Region: Looking for the 21st Century's Strategic Solutions" organised by the Institute of Europe (RAS), in collaboration with the Institute for Strategic Studies and Analysis (Moscow) and the New Eurasia Foundation was held in Moscow on 14-17 June 2008.

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